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ARTICLE

Dialogues on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in Baltimore: Interreligious Missteps and Opportunities

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Abstract

I work at a 501(c)3 non-profit in Baltimore that combats religious bigotry and co-builds resilient interreligious communities. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has always brought challenges to this work. However, Hamas' murderous rampage on October 7, 2023 and what the majority of human rights organizations inside of and outside of the State of Israel see as the IDF's subsequent genocide against Gazans has made our work nearly impossible. There is also the added challenge of the increased weaponization of accusations of antisemitism to silence pro-Palestinian advocacy—especially by the targeted use of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism—as well as the weaponization of U.S. Immigration and Enforcement (ICE) to detain and deport pro-Palestinian advocates. The paper shares and examines a program we have been running for our constituencies since October 7th. It explores the challenges of weaponized accusations of antisemitism and offers a way forward for practitioners of interreligious dialogue who don't always agree about how to interpret this conflict.

Keywords

dialogue, Israel-Palestine, interreligious, Baltimore

As many people already know, the topic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict often prevents any meaningful dialogical encounter. Much of my own work these days is a commentary on this assertion. I work at an institute whose mission is "to dismantle religious bias and bigotry" by building "learning communities where religious difference becomes a powerful force for good."[1] For the past twelve years I have been working with communities in and around Baltimore city to build robust and resilient interreligious networks. I don't have a classroom, nor do I have any power over my students. Everyone who studies with me volunteers their time and energy. I am accountable to my board and our many constituencies. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is always the elephant in the room in our programming, fellowships, and in our courses. As an organization we are unable to advocate for any one political solution to the conflict, since our board, our stakeholders and our constituencies disagree fundamentally on what that should be. We are accountable, for instance, to people who support the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, as well as to those who believe that this movement is antisemitic. One key aspect of our work is to keep these people and communities in relationship with one another.

Almost immediately after October 7th, 2023, all our networks were in danger of collapsing. Some people associated with our work seemed to have giving up in some way on this mission. There are many reasons to why this happened. Since then, though, my colleagues have led well over fifty sessions with around 750–1000 people to find ways to preserve relationships and develop ways to discuss and think about much of this unthinkable violence. We made a commitment to lean into our mission, which meant organizing and leading in-person, face-to-face dialogues about Israel, Gaza, and all other related issues regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We made it clear to our partners, constituents, and supporters, that we sought to preserve our interreligious spaces, remaining committed to continuing challenging

1 I am the Jewish scholar and Head of Scholarship at the Institute for Islamic, Christian, and Jewish Studies (ICJS) in Baltimore, MD. We are "an independent, educational nonprofit [that] straddles the academic arena and the public square with programming to advance interreligious dialogue and understanding. Our audiences include the general public, seminarians, higher-ed faculty, congregational leaders, civic leaders, teachers, and chaplains. Through educational programming, public-facing scholarship, and relationship-centered fellowships and workshops, ICJS models a new conversation in the public square that affirms religious diversity in the United States." Here is our mission: "To dismantle religious bias and bigotry, ICJS builds learning communities where religious difference becomes a powerful force for good." Our Vision: "ICJS envisions an interreligious society in which dialogue replaces division, friendship overcomes fear, and education eradicates ignorance." For more information, including learning more about our values, see our website: www.icjs.org.

conversations between communities. All parties agreed that silence neither advances justice, nor peace. Yet, as we know, many people started avoiding friends, colleagues, neighbors or family members who held different views from their own. This created a different type of silence. While we must be encouraged to say difficult truths, we must also be able to hear them.

In what follows here, first, I will describe a simple program that we developed to help people engage in dialogue on this topic by considering how to listen without responding and by learning how to ask clarifying questions. I will share how the program operates and then examine what has been successful and unsuccessful. Second, I want to share an external challenge: I will briefly explore how the politics regarding legal definitions of antisemitism, especially that of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) are impacting our institute's ability to engage effectively in interreligious dialogue.[2] Critiques of Israel and of Zionism are a necessary part of interreligious encounters and the IHRA definition of antisemitism violates people's religious freedom, because for many Palestinians in our communities, their identities and experiences are not only at times invisible, but also their very identities are perceived to be antisemitic. Third, I will share how current U.S. policy makers seek to not only undermine our work in interreligious dialogue but also seek to make the identities of some our participants illegal. Finally, I will share a few thoughts on how to continue our work despite these very real and unsettling challenges.

The Program

This program is not meant for complete strangers. It is designed for people who know one another, whether in a work environment, school, or a third space community. We also use it for a week-long retreat for Jewish, Christian, and Muslim seminarians called "the Emerging Religious Leaders Intensive (ERLI)."[3] When my colleagues are invited to lead a conversation about the conflict, we use the following approach. We send out a questionnaire before the meeting comprising of three questions: (1) Name one thing you know about the conflict with certainty; (2) Name one thing you understand about the conflict but might be wrong about; and (3) Name one thing you don't know about the conflict. This exercise produces three documents: one

2 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), "Working Definition of Antisemitism," IHRA website, https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism.

3 "Emerging Leaders in Training," Instituted for Islamic, Christian, and Jewish Studies, https://icjs.org/emerging-religious-leaders/.

document with statements of (1) what we know, (2) don't know, (3) and are uncertain of, regarding the conflict. All the statements are anonymous and grouped accordingly. We sit in a circle and hand out one document. We start with document (3), statements of uncertainty, and move backward. Each of us takes a turn reading a statement from the sheet out loud. Sometimes we are forced to read something we disagree with. This is where we find opportunities to engage dialogically and respectfully. It's important to know the views in the room. It's important to know that each of us draws from different narratives and sources of information. It's important to know that each person's intention is genuine and motivated by ethical sensibilities. The goal is to create a space where people can learn from one another and to investigate their own intuitions and orientations to the world while also feeling supported and affirmed. The statements remain anonymous. It doesn't mean we all will agree. That never happens. However, the goal is for us to be more introspective.

Even before we started running this program, how people oriented to the Israel-Palestinian conflict was always the elephant in the room. People seemed more comfortable allowing for deep irreconcilable theological differences than they were listening to an opposing view of the conflict. For interreligious dialogue to be meaningful and transformational, we need to be able to discuss this conflict. Otherwise, all other conversations seem aesthetic, or worse, complicit in some form of violence. This remains a problem. If we must recognize pain everywhere, then how do we enter into dialogue with a sense of justice, truth, and reconciliation? How do we recognize the truth in all experiences? Where is the place for recognition, contrition, and truth if you and your people also feel hurt and pain? How do we share our vulnerability, when we're uncertain whether our vulnerability will be weaponized against us? How do we create a space to say the wrong thing? Very often in these conversations, participants experience what the Jewish philosopher of dialogue Martin Buber called a "mismeeting" (*Vergegnung*): A moment when people are unable to communicate fully.[4] It happens when a person hears something in a way that wasn't intended by the speaker. There are so many ways in which we speak past one another, that very often mismeetings create a sense of loneliness and even despair. In these meetings, someone inevitably says the wrong thing.

In most interpersonal encounters, dialogue is not purposeful: It happens. Dialogue is not always empathetic. Sometimes the other's feelings and experiences are beyond what we can imagine or have experienced ourselves.

4 Martin Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments," in *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, ed. Paul Arthur Schlipp and Maurice Friedman (Open Court Publishers, 1967), 4.

To be empathic is, in many ways, to project meaning on to others that may at times disaffirm the integrity of another's experience or way of being in the world. To be dialogical requires listening to another unfiltered and without interpretation, as if this voice was emerging from within one's own self. In dialogue, we should be able to listen to the other as a shared experience: I should be able to listen to the other in a dialogical encounter—participate in their experience and way of being in the world—without disaffirming or abandoning my own experience or lived realities.

Our First Challenge: Heresy

One major challenge in these settings is heresy. A heresy changes the way you perceive and encounter a person. Once the heresy is spoken or written, the heretic's behaviors, ideas, and opinions will always be interpreted as in service of that heresy. A heresy is an anathema to your own existence. It is not only an affront to your worldview, but to your values and ethical disposition. You will interpret the entirety of the heretic's life—past, present, and future—through this heresy. The person changes ontologically. Their heresy changes your orientation and relationship to that person. The heresy is discovered.

Compounding the problem, as Marianne Moyaert has recently argued, heresy is one form of religio-racial identity. Through a process called "religionization" in Europe, Moyaert has shown historically how Christians engaged in "co-dependent processes of 'selfing' and 'othering' that are predicated on religious difference."[5] This process is "akin to and intersects with notions like ethnicization, gendering, as racialization." Religionization allowed Christians to name, rename and classify their "others" though state and imperial power. In fact, since the second century the accusation of heresy, according to Moyaert, has been an important, and later violent, tool for many European Christians.[6]

Heresy is not simply a theological or interreligious issue, it is also ethical, political, and even cultural. "To complicate matters," according to John Inazu, "we also disagree over the nature of our disagreements."[7] I travel in progressive religious and political social and professional circles. There are

5 Marianne Moyaert, *Christian Imaginations of the Religious Other: A History of Religionization* (John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 2024.), 1.

6 Moyaert, *Christian Imaginations of the Religious Other*, 38–43.

7 John D. Inazu, *Confident Pluralism: Surviving and Thriving through Deep Difference* (University of Chicago Press, 2016), 1–13; See also Moyaert, *Christian Imaginations of the Religious Other*, 297–330.

heresies in my groups. If someone in my orbit said something overtly racist or homophobic, they would have committed a heresy. The statement itself becomes an extension of that person's identity. They are now racist, or homophobic. However, the heresy itself belies a deeper truth: This is a person with whom we cannot dialogue, because we cannot trust their intentions. They are committed to this heresy. "What makes heresy all the more problematic," Moyaert writes, "is that it presents itself under the pretense of truth."[8] Thus, there is no impetus to dialogue with heretics.

Most argue, however, the fact of difference is essential to healthy and productive dialogue.[9] Heresy is inevitable. Universalism is helpful, but it is only part of the work. In my experience, people are far more tolerant and even comfortable with differences in theologies and worldviews than they are with opinions or ideologies about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, abortion access, or LGBTQ+ rights. But does difference always imply heresy? Possibly. We learn in these settings that people build boundaries around their views and identity. Belief and heresy operate entirely in a world within these boundaries. In some cases, dialogue disrupts those boundaries, in others it helps people see why the boundaries are there, and even important to those who preserve them. The question I often ask people during this program is to consider one's own boundaries: How do you preserve boundaries in your religious and political life? What am I willing to compromise to allow someone to inhabit my life? At this moment, are there certain issues or ideas that are completely untouchable in my relationship with others? What makes them untouchable? Can you remember changing your mind on an issue or an idea? Have there been experiences or encounters that have influenced you to see or live in the world differently?

We often remind our participants that they are courageous. This is incredibly difficult work. For example, do all boundaries get in the way of dialogue and genuine mutuality? Most of them understand that tolerance is a virtue in interreligious spaces, yet should we also be tolerant of intolerance? How does that work? The concept of tolerance in philosophy is

8 Moyaert, *Christian Imaginations of the Religious Other*, 41.

9 Inazu, *Confident Pluralism*, xiii. He writes: "we need to acknowledge the fact of our differences, or what philosophers sometimes call the fact of pluralism. Recognizing the fact of pluralism does not mean that we think all differences are good. Pluralism is not relativism, and most of us are not relativists. Most of us believe that at least some of our differences matter. We hold some beliefs strongly enough to orient our lives around them. Because we believe the answers to some questions matter, and that they ultimately matter for everyone, we do not think that all differences are a good thing."

often elusive and, at times, replete with paradoxes and antinomies.[10] Dialogue around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in our program illustrates these problems: How does our dialogical obligation to the Other reconcile our civic responsibility to oppose what we perceive to be unethical and irresponsible beliefs, behaviors, or policies? In many cases, there is simply no middle path. Many of us are unable to tolerate bigotry, hatred, and violence. And while this is obviously not a problem in general, of course, it is *the* problem in conversations about this conflict. What happens when people start accusing each other of bigotry? What happens when there are examples of this bigotry in cases regarding people from a variety or religious and national backgrounds? What happens when each of us is guilty of some heresy? What happens when all heresy is perceived as bigotry?

Our Second Challenge: The Politics of Defining Antisemitism

While we have the tools to help people navigate these complicated and uncomfortable conversations, we run into the problem that the perception of heresy has taken a legal form with the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) definition of antisemitism.[11]

Talking about the relationship between Zionism and antisemitism is complicated. For example, many people interpret Zionism differently, so we have a difficult time deciphering what people intend to say because we tend to interpret their use of the word according to our definition of it. A concrete definition of Zionism remains elusive, which allows those invested in the political future of Israel to provide procrustean solutions to wide-ranging political problems. For example, those who defend the application and actualization of Zionism in the current State of Israel argue that Zionism, broadly, is a national liberation movement for a historically diverse, dispersed, and persecuted ethnic-religious group returning home after millennia to their homeland. Critics of this movement view Zionism as a classic example of colonialism, which is a nationalist, racist ideology that encouraged widespread denial of rights and the expulsion of an indigenous population.

When it comes to criticizing Israel or Zionism, accusations of antisemitism abound. The academic and political rhetoric regarding these accusations can be vitriolic, confusing, and intimidating. Can one

10 David Heyd, "Introduction," *Toleration: An Elusive Virtue* (Princeton University Press, 1996), 3.

11 IHRA, "Working Definition of Antisemitism."

simultaneously be committed to combating antisemitism while also believing Israel's policies in the West Bank, for example, are akin to apartheid, or believe the political ideology of Zionism today is racist? What about accusations of genocide in Gaza?[12] What if your critique of Israel is informed by theological points of view? Are all theological critiques supersessionist? The term "supersessionism" is standard fare in scholarly discourse regarding Jewish-Christian relations. It is an easy and not-so easy word to define.[13] It is sometimes referred to as "replacement theology."[14] More recently, it has also been associated with colonialism and White Supremacy.[15] The word itself denotes a particular theological move away

12 As early as October 13,2023, genocide studies scholars warned of the risk genocide in Gaza. See Raz Segal, "A Textbook case of Genocide," *Jewish Currents*, Oct 13, 2025 and A. Dirk Moses, "More than Genocide," *Boston Review*, Nov. 14, 2023. Since January, 2024, the *Journal of Genocide Research* has hosted a forum on Gaza, with over seventy scholars worldwide reflecting on the question of genocide. Today, there are scholars who are unequivocal. See, for example, Omer Bartov, "I'm a Genocide Scholar: I Know It When I See It," *New York Times*, July 15, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/15/opinion/israel-gaza-holocaust-genocide-palestinians.html.

13 See Moyaert, *Christian Imaginations of the Religious Other*, 30–43; Amy-Jill Levine, "Supersessionism: Admit and Address Rather than Debate and Deny," *Religions* 13, no. 2 (2022): https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13020155; Jesper Svartvik, "'I Have Come Not to Abolish, but to Fulfil': Reflections on Understanding Christianity as Fulfillment without Presupposing Supersessionism," *Religions* 13, no. 1 (2022): https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13020149; David M. Neuhaus, "Where to from Here? Continuing Challenges in Jewish-Catholic Conversation," *Religions* 12, no. 11 (2022): https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12110929; David Novak, "Supersessionism Hard and Soft," *First Things*, February 1, 2019, https://firstthings.com/supersessionism-hard-and-soft/; R. Kendall Soulen, "Supersessionism," *Dictionary of Jewish-Christian Relations*, ed. Edward Kessler and Neil Wenborn (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 413–14.

14 Eva Fleischner, "The Shoah and Jewish-Christian Relations," in *The Memory of Goodness: Eva Fleischner and her Contributions to Holocausts* Studies, ed. Carol Rittner and John K. Roth (Seton Hill University Press, 2022), 136.

15 See Colin Kidd, *The Forging of the Races: Race and Scripture in the Protestant Atlantic World, 1600-2000* (Cambridge University Press, 2006); J. Kameron Carter, *Race: A Theological Account* (Oxford University Press, 2008); Jeannine Hill Fletcher, *The Sin of White Supremacy: Christianity, Racism, and Religious Diversity in America* (Orbis, 2017); Willie James Jennings, *The Christian Imagination: Theology and the Origins of Race* (Yale University Press, 2010); Willie James Jennings, *After Whiteness: An Education in* Belonging (William B. Eerdmans, 2020); Robert P. Jones, *White Too Long: The Legacy of White Supremacy in American Christianity* (Simon & Schuster, 2020); Santiago Slabodsky, "It's the Theology Stupid! Coloniality, Anti-Blackness, and the Bounds of 'Humanity,'" in *Anti-Blackness and Christian Ethics*, ed. Vincent W. Lloyd and Andrew Prevot (Orbis, 2017), 19–40; M. Shawn Copeland, "White Supremacy and Anti-Black Logics in the Making of U.S. Catholicism," in *Anti-Blackness and Christian Ethics*, 19–40; Terence Keel, *Divine Variations: How Christian Thought Became*

from the Hebrew Bible (what Christians refer to as the "Old Testament") and the divine covenant with Jews toward a new divine covenant sealed with the messiahship of Jesus Christ. This new covenant superseded the old one. It also meant that the church superseded—indeed replaced—Judaism as God's favored people.[16] For some scholars, critiques of the state of Israel follow the same theological trajectory, that some critique is supersessionist, and thus antisemitic.[17] Michael G. Azar recently challenged this view and argued these accusations of supersessionism may have emerged as a polemical political device in debates about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that the term itself was a neologism coined by the American Methodist theologian A. Roy Eckardt as a way to suggest that Christian critique of Israel was grounded in ancient anti-Judaism, rather than in a sense of justice or other political concerns.[18] It allowed supporters of the state of Israel to argue that Christian critique of Israel was supersessionist at best, and antisemitic at worst. Indeed, many efforts to define antisemitism consider what we can and cannot say about Israel. And, sadly, often fear of saying the wrong thing renders many people silent.

Kenneth S. Stern poignantly captures the predicament of this in the academy. In discussing the political ramifications of "The Antisemitism Awareness Act of 2016," Stern worried that the legislation would suppress free speech and academic freedom on campuses. "If the legislation passed,"

Racial Science (Stanford University Press, 2018); Khyati Y. Joshi, *White Christian Privilege: The Illusion of Religious Equality in America* (New York University Press, 2020); Mark A. Noll, *God and Race in American Politics: A Short History* (Princeton University Press, 2008).

16 Eva Fleischner, "The Teaching of Contempt: The Origins of Christian Anti-Judaism," in *The Memory of Goodness*, 66–67. She writes: "In trying to find its identity, the church saw itself as the 'new' Israel, as the new people of God, which had inherited all the promises and privileges of the first people of God, the Jews. The church believed that the Jewish people had failed in its mission—namely, recognizing and welcoming the Messiah—and had therefore lost its claim to be the people of God. The church had taken their place . . . . This argument would have been more convincing if the Jewish people had disappeared, had ceased to exist, as was the case with so many peoples in the ancient world. But they did not disappear, despite the catastrophic destruction of the Roman wars. They not only continued to exist, but regained strength—the first Roman war was followed by the flowering of rabbinic Judaism—and the Jews continued to make converts."

17 See Adam Gregerman, "Old Wine in New Bottles, Liberation Theology and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 41, no. 2 (June 2004): 313–340. See also Adam Gregerman, "How the State of Israel Became 'the Jew' writ large," *Fathom*, Oct. 2024, https://fathomjournal.org/opinion-how-the-state-of-israel-became-the-jew-writ-large/.

18 See Michael G. Azar, "'Supersessionism': The Political Origins of a Theological Neologism," *Studies in Jewish-Christian Relations* 16, no.1 (2021): 1–25.

Stern wrote, "Jewish studies professors would be worried that they could not teach effectively. They knew that outside groups, including the ones that had brought the failed Title VI cases, would be looking over their shoulders, hunting for statements and assignments and programs and classroom room texts and invited speakers that they believed transgressed the definition [of antisemitism]. If your PhD is in nineteenth-century Jewish *shtetl* life, and you're going to get beat up for teaching about modern Israel, you'll likely choose to teach about older, less controversial, Jewish history instead."[19]

The problem is that the term "antisemitism" covers a wide range of views.[20] It could convey a simple, personal animus or prejudice against Jews or Judaism or be used as a justification for mass violence or genocide.[21] Do prejudice and advocating for genocide come from the same impulse? Does each person who assumes Jews are cheap or good with money also believe Jews should be eradicated? What about Israel? Is advocating for one state with equal rights for Jewish Israelis and Palestinians the same as advocating for violence or even genocide against Jews? Is advocating for Palestinian rights through slogans like "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free" the same as advocating violence against Jews? There is not a simple answer to these questions, yet they inform how scholars work to provide a more nuanced, conceptual framework to address the problem of antisemitism.

Definitions are important. Most scholars of antisemitism recognize that the history and the politics of this phenomenon simply cannot be portrayed or understood by a single definition. Yet, legally, to prosecute hate crimes, we need concrete definitions. In a review of a recent book entitled *Key Concepts in the Study of Antisemitism*,[22] Joshua Shanes outlined the salient issues of the debate over defining antisemitism.[23] The "real debate," he argues, is "not about the nature of antisemitism nor even about clearly conspiratorial anti-

19 Kenneth S. Stern, *The Conflict over the Conflict: The Israel/Palestine Campus Debate*, 165–66.

20 See Mark Mazower, *On Antisemitism: A Word in History* (Penguin Press, 2025).

21 See Ben Halpern, "What is Antisemitism?," *Modern Judaism* 1, no. 3 (1981): 251–62; David Berger, "Anti-Semitism: An Overview," in *History of Hate: The Dimensions of Antisemitism* (The Jewish Publication Society, 1986), 3–14; Wistrich, *The Longest Hatred*, xv–xxvi; Albert Lindemann, *Anti-Semitism Before the Holocaust* (Routledge, 2000), 8–12; Dina Porat and Kenneth S. Stern, "Defining Antisemitism," *Antisemitism Worldwide* (2003/4): 5–28.

22 Sol Goldberg, Scott Ury, Kalman Weiser (eds.), *Key Concepts in the Study of Antisemitism* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave-Macmillian, 2021).

23 Sol Goldberg, Scott Ury, Kalman Weiser, eds., *Key Concepts in the Study of Antisemitism* (Palgrave-Macmillian, 2021); Joshua Shanes, "The Politics of Defining Antisemitism," *Shofar* 40, no. 3 (2022): 188–198.

Zionist rhetoric." Rather, "it is about anti-Zionist rhetoric that is *not* connected to antisemitic mythology."[24] Indeed, as Scott Ury points out in the book, most debates about defining antisemitism today in fact are about its relationship to Zionism and Israel.[25] People seem to agree on everything else. At the center of the debate is the implementation of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism into policy and law. Even more specifically, it regards several examples of antisemitism in this definition that equate anti-Zionism with antisemitism, as we will examine below.

In 2016, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) released a "working definition" of antisemitism. Here's the definition:

> Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.[26]

Those who researched and drafted the definition at the IHRA did not intend for it to be used to develop legislation or even to be implemented as a template to determine hate speech. Kenneth S. Stern, the "definition's lead drafter," wrote that the IHRA definition was "written in 2004 for European data collectors," and was wary of efforts to "abuse" this definition in ways it was not intended.[27] Stern stressed that this definition was not meant to be used as a political device to silence critics of the State of Israel, nor to intimidate them. "Despite the fact that some of the contemporary anti-Israel rhetoric is antisemitic," he wrote, "adoption of this definition would paint with much too broad a brush."[28] Despite Stern's reservations and concerns about the adoption of this definition as policy, and in some cases as law, the United States is moving closer to doing both. In 2019, Stern advocated against the proposed "Antisemitism Awareness Act" and then-President

24 Shanes, "The Politics of Defining Antisemitism," 189–190.
25 Scott Ury, "Zionism," in *Key Concepts in the Study of Antisemitism*, ed. Goldberg, et al., 288–92.
26 IHRA, "Working Definition of Antisemitism."
27 Kenneth S. Stern, *The Conflict Over the Conflict: The Israel/Palestine Debate*, 11.
28 Stern, *The Conflict Over the Conflict*, 170.

Trump's executive order adopting the IHRA definition to prosecute Title VI offenses.[29] Stern wrote:

> Title VI does not, and should not, prohibit antisemitic expression. Campuses should make sure that none of their students—Jews and non-Jews, pro-Israel and anti-Israel—is the victim of pervasive intimidation or harassment. That's quite different from protecting them from hearing unpleasant, and even bigoted ideas.[30]

This is an important criterion even in interreligious contexts. When do unreasonable critiques or assertions become bigoted statements or hate speech? Definitions should be a way to clarify these matters.

Interestingly, the definition itself was not initially controversial, although several scholars found it cumbersome. In one report, the director of the London Birkbeck Institute for the Study of Antisemitism, David Feldman, found it "bewilderingly imprecise."[31] The immediate problem had to do with language in the first part: what is the word "perception" doing in this definition? Is the "perception" what is "expressed as hatred toward Jews"? As many scholars have already pointed out, this emphasis on perception places most of the attention on the perceived antisemitic caricatures and stereotypes of Jews: In other words, how a Jew is perceived. The focus here is on intention. Yet proving intention is complicated. It always requires context. This is the problem that Stern is alluding to here. While the second part of the definition is a littler clearer—"Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities"—it still requires readers to figure out the "perception," especially since the language includes non-Jews and their property, in order for the second part to make sense. However, what makes the definition controversial is the examples that best conveyed and characterized this definition. Of the eleven examples provided, seven focused on Israel. Of the seven, three have been singled out as highly problematic:

29 "Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" sets the standard for nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs. See Civil Rights Division, US Department of Justice website, last updated March 24, 2025, https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/TitleVI#1.

30 Kenneth S. Stern, *The Conflict Over the Conflict*, 170.

31 David Feldman, "Will Britain's New Definition of Antisemitism Help Jewish People? I'm Skeptical," *The Guardian*, December 28, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/28/britain-definition-antisemitism-british-jews-jewish-people.

1. "Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is racist endeavor."
2. "Applying double standards by requiring of [Israel] a behaviour not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation."
3. "Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis."

The first two examples here—the claim against Israel as a racist state and the application of Natan Sharansky's rule on double standards— are very difficult to adjudicate.[32] Both require more context. The third, however, is simply confusing. Both Israelis and Palestinians accuse one another of Nazism. Israelis accuse other Israelis of being Nazis. Israelis often argue the policies of their political opponents are akin to Nazism. In early 2005, for example, when the Knesset approved the Disengagement Plan Implementation Law to relocate eight thousand Jewish-Israeli settlers out of Gaza, opponents to this law in Gush Katif protested by wearing yellow stars of David. They even claimed that Gaza was *Judenfrei.* Recently, Israeli delegates at the UN wore those stars to protest the UN's criticism of Israel's military action in Gaza. At the same time, Riyad al-Maliki, the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Palestinian National Authority, argued that it was in fact the Israelis who are killing and forcibly displacing Palestinians. The basic problem with Nazi comparisons is that *reductio ad Hitlerum* can go on *ad infinitum*. This is a problem worldwide. Famously, the American attorney Michael Godwin suggested that such comparisons often lead to absurd observations or conclusions. Using a probability model, Godwin observed that "as an online discussion continues, the probability of a comparison to

32 On Sharansky see "Foreword," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 16, nos. 3-4 (Fall 2004): 5–6. In 2004, in the foreword to an issue of *Jewish Political Studies Review* exploring antisemitism, Sharansky, the famed Soviet dissident and Israeli politician, argued that the "new anti-Semitism"—where Israel becomes the collective Jew—"can hide behind the veneer of legitimate criticism of Israel." His three Ds—demonization, double standards, delegitimization—were tests designed to expose the antisemitic animus behind certain critiques of Israel. When "Israel's actions are blown out of all sensible proportion," such as in comparisons of its policies to that of Nazism, or "when Israel is singled out by the United Nations for human rights abuses while the behavior of known major abusers, such as China, Iran, Cuba, and Syria, is ignored, or "when Israel's fundamental right to exist is denied," then the critique of Israel, according to Sharansky, is antisemitic. Also see David N. Myers, "Yes. Palestinians Have the Right to Speak About Antisemitism," *Forward*, Dec. 4, 2020: https://forward.com/opinion/459654/yes-palestinians-have-the-right-to-speak-about -antisemitism/

Hitler or to Nazis approaches one." [33] Because of our polarized environment, it is almost inevitable one side will accuse the other of Nazism. This happens online. It also happens in parliaments and governments. It happens in local and national politics. Sadly, these comparisons are simply common in most public and private discourse. While Godwin's Law "still serves us as a tool to recognize specious comparisons to Nazism," Godwin wrote, he did not assert that all comparisons to Nazism are *prima facie* wrong, but rather "by contrast, to recognize comparisons that aren't."[34] Such comparisons in certain cases can be useful. Regardless, given the ubiquity of such comparisons in so many political contexts, how can a definition of antisemitism assert unequivocally that all comparisons of Nazism to Israel's policies are *a priori* antisemitic? This is why critics of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism argue that it is ambiguous, inconsistent, and even incoherent.

This takes us back to the problem of the word "perception." So, when a journalist writes that Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel's Minister of National Security, might be the "Jewish Hitler," is this suggestion antisemitic?[35] Ben-Gvir is famous for calling Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish-Israeli terrorist who murdered 29 Muslim worshippers in 1994, "a hero."[36] He is also famous for distributing manipulated images of then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin wearing an SS uniform. These images appeared and were celebrated a month before the prime minister was assassinated. Ben-Gvir was protesting Israel's policies. He called the sitting Prime Minister a Nazi. The journalist asserted that Ben-Gvir's rhetoric played a role in Rabin's assassination, and whose current policies are deemed discriminatory and inflammatory, which makes him a Jewish Hitler. Who is antisemitic here? To answer by using the IHRA definition, we need to discern the intentions of the accused, not the actual statements, or even the actions related to those statements. In the case of Ben-Gvir, many have seen a connection to his political speech—comparing Rabin to Nazism—and the political rhetoric and violence that may have inspired his murder.[37] Again, is it appropriate to assert that Ben-

33 Mike Godwin, "Do We Need to Update Godwin's Law About the Probability Of Comparison to Nazis?" *The Los Angeles Times*, June 24, 2018, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-godwin-godwins-law-20180624-story.html.

34 Godwin, "Do We Need to Update Godwin's Law."

35 Uriel Abulof, "Have I Just Met the Jewish Hitler?" *Washington Monthly*, November 25, 2022, https://washingtonmonthly.com/2022/11/25/have-i-just-met-the-jewish-hitler/.

36 Abulof, "Have I Just Met the Jewish Hilter?"

37 Doron Weber, "They Incited Rabin's Murder. Now They're Murdering Israel's Democracy," Op-ed, *Haaretz*, July 9, 2023, https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/

Gvir engaged in antisemitic critique that inspired the murder of a prominent Jewish leader? And, what about the journalist? Is calling a Jewish-Israeli who supports violence and ethnic cleansing a Nazi antisemitic?

And, what about accusations of genocide? If comparisons to Nazism are antisemitic, then what does that do about such accusations against the state of Israel. In December of 2023, the country of South Africa brought up charges of genocide against Israel in the International Court of Justice. Early in 2024, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Michael Fakhri also accused Israel of committing genocide against the Palestinian people in Gaza.[38] For many critics of Israel, the accusation itself seems to be enough to merit the conviction. Even though it could take years to convict Israel, or any country for that matter, of committing genocide, often you see and hear slogans to stop Israel's genocide against Palestinians. Activists have even called former President Joe Biden "Genocide Joe" for continuing to send to Israel US weapons and technologies designed to kill civilians. Support for Israel through this practice, for many activists, is akin to supporting genocide. We can debate the merits of these accusations. Yet many are suggesting, using the IHRA definition, that these rhetorical moves and strategies are antisemitic.[39] However, we run into the same problem with Ben-Gvir above: How can we determine a critic's "perception" of Jews and the intention of critique? What if many well-intended, well-informed people see evidence of genocide in Gaza?[40]

Again, intention and context matters. Scholars, judges, and lawyers from all sides of the debate are arguing the merits of the accusations of genocide. Many agree, some do not. There are several Jewish-Israeli genocide scholars who are arguing that the accusation is legitimate. There are many ways to offer the same accusation, yet can they all be *a priori* antisemitic? These

2023-07-09/ty-article-opinion/.premium/they-incited-rabins-murder-now-theyre-murdering-israels-democracy/00000189-3a5f-da0e-a59b-bb7f1fc30000

38 Nina Lakhani, " Israel is Deliberately Starving Palestinians, UN Rights Experts Say," *The Guardian*, February 27, 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20240228041844/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/27/un-israel-food-starvation-palestinians-war-crime-genocide.

39 Frida Ghitis, "The Antisemitic Lie at the Heart of Too Many Campus Protests," *CNN*, May 7, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/07/opinions/columbia-university-israel-campus-protests-antisemitism-ghitis/index.html.

40 Omer Bartov, "As a Former IDF Soldier and Historian of Genocide, I Was Deeply Disturbed By My Recent Visit to Israel," *The Guardian*, August 13, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/13/israel-gaza-historian-omer-bartov; Omer Bartov, "I'm a Genocide Scholar: I Know It When I See It," *New York Times*, July 15, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/15/opinion/israel-gaza-holocaust-genocide-palestinians.html.

debates, in addition, are having a direct and significant impact on people's lives: They are part of a deliberate attempt to suppress critique. Raz Segal, for example, a Jewish-Israeli scholar of the Holocaust and Genocide studies, had his job offer rescinded at the University of Minnesota for suggesting that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza.[41]

Many trainings in anti-racism seek to separate statements from individuals. When someone says something racist, a trained anti-racist responds by focusing on the statement, not on a person's being. You are not attacking the person, but rather criticizing the idea. To call a statement racist is very different from calling a person racist. Ideas can change and people have a right to not always be conflated with their ideas. People who desire not to be racist need to account for how racism in the United States informed their worldviews and ideas. Many of us need to "own" our racism if we are to be liberated from it.[42] We need to know what is shackling us ideologically. The problem with the IHRA definition of antisemitism is that it reverses the process. Before we can identify a statement or activity that is antisemitic, we need to discern intention, i.e., a certain "perception" the person has about Jews.

And, we run into another important problem. According to the IHRA definition of antisemitism, what recourse is there for Palestinians and their advocates? Some are arguing that the IHRA definition of antisemitism is being weaponized to quell pro-Palestinian positions. Why should those who support the state of Israel and its policies determine what is an acceptable and unacceptable critique of it? This is unusual and may even be an unprecedented double standard, since it would be difficult to imagine people crafting policies and laws that determine what is and is not acceptable criticisms of Iran or Saudi Arabia within the confines of Islamophobia. There is now a growing fear among scholars, lawyers, and activists that if the IHRA definition of antisemitism becomes law, then advocacy for Palestinian rights and liberation, whether through the BDS movement or any run-of-the-mill activism, would be regulated and legally sanctioned.[43] Indeed, as more and more states and municipalities incorporate the IHRA's definition of antisemitism, the more likely it's becoming a reality that advocacy for

41 Maggie Hicks, "A Holocaust Scholar Called Israel's Actions in Gaza 'Genocide.' It Cost Him a Job Offer," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, June 17, 2024, https://www.chronicle.com/article/a-holocaust-scholar-called-israels-actions-in-palestine-genocide-it-cost-him-a-job-offer.

42 Robin Diangelo, White Fragility: Why It's so Hard for White People to Talk about Racism (Beacon Press, 2018), 145.

43 Atalia Omer, "A Subversive Pedagogy for Teaching Palestine/Israel," *Journal of Interreligious Studies* 49 (2026): 38–70.

Palestinians will be prosecuted as a hate crime. For example, in Arizona, when "antisemitism as defined by the IHRA" becomes law, "a pro-Palestinian protester" in the state could be "swept up and arrested by police, eligible for hate crimes for carrying a Palestinian flag."[44] And, we run into another unfortunate irony: This was not the intention of those who drafted the definition. Yet it is impacting what people can and cannot say about Israel.[45] This makes the work of interreligious dialogue even more difficult.

Our Third Challenge: Project Esther

People are not just using the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism to silence dissent. Published on October 7, 2024 within the conservative Heritage Foundations *Project 2025*, which seeks to reshape the American Federal government to be more amenable to a right-winged agenda, is *Project Esther: A National Strategy to Combat Antisemitism*.[46] According to the *New York Times*, as of May 2025, the Trump Administration has acted on more the half the proposals.[47] The strategy is clear and simple: It seeks to link antisemitism to anti-Zionism, anti-Americanism, and solidarity with Palestinian liberation.[48] The executive summary of the document states:

> America's virulently anti-Israel, anti-Zionist, and anti-American "pro-Palestinian movement" is part of a global Hamas Support Network (HSN) that is trying to compel the U.S. government to abandon its long-standing support for Israel. Supported by activists and funders dedicated to the destruction of capitalism and democracy, the HSN benefits from the support and training of

44 Isaac Scher, "Three States Push to Curb Palestinian Activism," *Jewish Currents*, April 26, 2022.

45 For a helpful guide on navigating this issue, see Rabbi Jill Jacobs, "Criticism of Israel and Antisemitism: How to Tell Where One Ends and the Other Begins," *T'ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights* website, published 2024, https://truah.org/resources/criticism-of-israel-and-antisemitism-how-to-tell-where-one-ends-and-the-other-begins/.

46 The Heritage Foundation, "Project Esther: A National Strategy to Combat Antisemitism," published October 7, 2024, https://www.heritage.org/progressivism/report/project-esther-national-strategy-combat-antisemitism.

47 See Katie J.M. Baker, "The Group Behind Project 2025 Has a Plan to Crush the Pro-Palestinian Movement," *The New York Times*, May 18, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/18/us/project-esther-heritage-foundation-palestine.html.

48 The name Esther evokes the Jewish heroine of the book of Esther in the Hebrew Bible who defeats the ancient Persians. One goal of the Esther project is to defeat the modern Persians in Iran.

> America's overseas enemies and seeks to achieve its goals by taking advantage of our open society, corrupting our education system, leveraging the American media, coopting the federal government, and relying on the American Jewish community's complacency. The National Task Force to Combat Antisemitism intends to enlist all willing and able partners in a coordinated effort to combat the scourge of antisemitism in the United States.[49]

Assumed in this strategy is that fighting antisemitism is part of a larger fight against a global Hamas support network (HSN) which works with progressives to dismantle both the United States and the State of Israel. To be antisemitic, then, is to be part of a civilizational battle against democracy and an open free society. The goal is to make antisemitism akin to terrorism, which is a national security threat. If supporting Palestinian liberation is understood as antisemitic, then it is also understood as supporting terrorism. This is how the administration is trying to deport academics like Mahmoud Khalil, Mohsen Mahdawi, Yunseo Chung, Rumeysa Izturk, and Badar Khan Suri.[50] It has been successful in deporting others.[51] *Project Esther* is weaponizing antisemitism to deport people who support Palestinian liberation.

In addition to the troubling policies associated with this strategy, when compared to common antisemitic conspiracy theories the strategy itself sounds antisemitic. In fact, the strategy is to employ antisemitic tropes and stereotypes in how it weaponizes accusations of antisemitism. It is insidious. It was written by three Chrisian Zionists and included a Jewish author later.[52] Re-reading the executive summary of the document, considering the comparison, the strategy to combat antisemitism itself sounds antisemitic. For example, if we replaced HSN with the word "Jew," imagine how this document would sound: Jews seeking to destroy our society and economy by running universities and corrupting our education system, by controlling the

49 Heritage Foundation, "Project Esther."

50 Josh Gerstein and Kyle Cheney, "Trump's Effort to Deport Pro-Palestinian Activists Goes to Trial," *Politico*, July 6, 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/06/trump-effort-deport-pro-palestinian-activists-trial-00439997.

51 Max Matza, "US Arrests Second Pro-Palestinian Columbia University Protester," *BBC News,* March 14, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3rnzp4ye5zo.

52 Katie J.M. Baker, "The Group Behind Project 2025 Has a Plan to Crush the Pro-Palestinian Movement," *The New York Times*, May 18, 2025. The Christian Zionist movement has deep roots in American Christian culture, which includes a complicated, and at times, troubling mythologizing or even stereotyping of Jews. See Robert O. Smith, *More Desired than Our Owne Salvation: The Roots of Christian Zionism* (Oxford University Press, 2013).

media, entertainment, and through a global network intent on destroying our civilizational values. What is more disturbing, though, is that the document itself blames Jews for the HSN! Firstly, it blames "American Jewish communities' complacency." Secondly, this nefarious network is funded by eight masterminds, including three prominent Jews, such as George Soros, Alex Soros, and JB Pritzker. Jews are part of this HSN ecosystem like Senator Bernie Sanders. These conspiracy theories have always inspired violence and have a common source.[53] Using antisemitic tropes to combat antisemitism in the service of silencing pro-Palestinian advocacy is antithetical to all interreligious work.

Parting Thoughts

Here is our current existential situation. Our interreligious spaces must be open to the above conversations to be honest and effective. However, we run into two major problems. The first is if the IHRA definition becomes federal law, then the above commentary becomes "illegal." The second is just as dire. Rep. David Kustoff of Tennessee introduced Bill H.R. 6408 "To

53 A hoax and a forgery detailing an insidious Jewish plot for world domination, the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* is unquestionably the modern world's most influential work of antisemitism. First produced in Russia in 1903, the work itself has been translated into numerous languages and distributed globally. Despite being exposed as a fraud by British and German newspapers in the early 1920s, German teachers assigned the work to their students, and it was widely read and studied throughout Nazi Germany (See Binjamin W. Segel, *Lie and a Libel: The History of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, trans. Richard S. Levy [University of Nebraska Press, 1995]). Stephen Eric Bronner offers a poignant summary of this text in the introduction to his study of it: "*The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* is probably the most influential work of antisemitism ever written. It consists of the supposed minutes from 24 sessions of a congress held by representatives from the 'twelve tribes of Israel' and led by a Grand Rabbi, whose purpose was to plan the conquest of the world. This congress never took place. The pamphlet is actually a crude forgery created by the Okhrana, or secret police, of Imperial Russia. It first appeared in 1903 and incorporates many of the most vicious myths about the Jews handed down over the centuries. Used initially to blame Jews and their supposedly servile allies, the Freemasons, for the 1905 revolution in Russia, the *Protocols* would be a welcome export around the world. If not simple hatred, then pogroms, and if not pogroms, then even worse, followed in its wake. It was applauded by royalty, it was embraced by counterrevolutionaries, and the Nazis made it required reading. It still serves as a staple for numerous fundamentalist, conservative, neofascist, and antisemitic groups in the United States and throughout the world." "Indeed," he continued, "what the *Communist Manifesto* is for Marxism, the fictitious *Protocols* is for antisemitism" (Stephen Eric Bronner, *A Rumor About the Jews: Conspiracy, Anti-Semitism, and the Protocols of the Zion*, 2nd ed. [Palgrave Macmillan, 2019], 1).

Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Terminate the Tax-Exempt Status of Terrorist Supporting Organizations" which allows the Secretary of the Treasury to strip 501(c)(3) status of organizations without due process. While it did not pass in the Senate in the Spring of 2025, it remains a threat. If the law is used to claim interreligious programs promote antisemitism, then the Secretary of the Treasury can end interreligious organizations with the stroke of a pen. As I mentioned above, we cannot do our work honestly or effectively without creating a space for people to be critical of Israel and of Zionism, or to see what has happened in Gaza as a genocide. In this way, the US may become more like contemporary Germany. Eyal Weizman, a Jewish-Israeli architect living in Germany, reports of the strange situation of being lectured "by the children and grandchildren of the perpetrators who murdered our families and who now dare to tell us that we are antisemitic."[54] So, to return to our program mentioned in the first part of the paper, we thought that keeping comments anonymous serves a pedagogical value in our dialogical settings, but now we recognize it is essential for the safety of us and our participants.

Building a culture of dialogue is based not on the sophistical skill of making one's opinion or worldview prevail over others, but rather on the dialectical skill of engaging in a joint search for truth. It should provide a language/discourse with which people can communicate even if they do not accept each other's religious commitments. Dialogue is not a means to an end. It does not have an objective. A dialogical encounter considers conventions in language, as well as the moral virtues informing each individual. Thus, it is difficult to teach dialogue transactionally since one does not become an expert in it.[55] We are not imparting knowledge in an objective manner. Those who are open to dialogical encounters do their best to address their own prejudices and worldviews in conversation. They also do their best to share their orientation to the world while listening patiently to the views of others. Disagreements are part of the dialogical experience. However, they should serve for more honest self-reflection. The dialogical space is not where you go to win an argument. Ideally a dialogical encounter provides us with an opportunity to glimpse into a realm that transcends personal ambition or ideological conviction, but rather can meet the needs of my interreligious other. Such efforts help people not only become cognizant of the values and commitments informing their identities, but also

54 George Prochnik, Eyal Weizman, and Emily Dische-Becker, "Once Again, Germany Defines Who is a Jew: Part I," *Granta* 165, November 23, 2023, https://granta.com/once-again-germany-defines-who-is-a-jew-part-i/.

55 Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (The Seabury Press, 1968), 57–74.

those of their interlocutors. They also help people realize that their values and commitments are more fluid and dynamic, always moving, which helps them appreciate, and even at times, empathize with others.

To conclude: "Genuine dialogue," wrote the Catholic theologian Eva Fleischner, "implies a dialectical relationship which is characterized by mutual respect, partnership and equality, freedom, willingness to listen to hear others, see them as they are, challenge them and be challenged in turn with whatever risk this may entail."[56] Risk here always implies danger. For Fleischner, this danger should play more of an active role in our dialogue. We can be fearful, but let us not be afraid. Dialogue may be able to still offer hope, but as she reminds us, it should not come at the expense of this danger. Hate is real. Our participants must find a dialogical way to live in between conflicting emotions, forever oscillating between hope and fear. Our participants need to be deeply attuned to this reality, a world replete with divergent passions. Commenting on the Enlightenment German-Jewish philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, the German-Jewish philosopher Franz Rosenzweig wrote that these passions represent "a danger we embrace with love," one "we would not wish to miss."[57] Love, like the feeling of danger, can be unpredictable and impossible to control. Both dialogue and love can be dangerous, yet who would want to live in a world without them? In conclusion, to be in dialogue at this very moment in our programs is to live a spiritual life precisely in that liminal space between fear and hope—the space in-between people, in-between worldviews, and in-between experiences—so that one may, in the words of the Psalmist, "be strong and of good courage" (Psalm 27:14).

In sum, you might be asking: Has any of this actually happened? I'm not sure. Also, I know there is no metric to measure this type of growth. However, people still attend our programs, join our fellowships, and donate to our work. I continue to remind them that they are courageous, that their feelings of fear are genuine and well founded, and that I admire their determination to remain with others whose views are fundamentally at odds with their own. And, as turns out, such a dialogical orientation to the world is now a conscious act of political resistance.

56 Eva Fleischner, *Judaism in German Christian Theology Since 1945: Christianity and Israel Considered in Terms of Mission* (Scarecrow Press, 1975), 105.

57 Franz Rosenzweig, "Vorspruch zu einer Mendelssohnfeier," *Zweistromland: Kleinere Schriften zu Glauben und Denken*, ed. Reinhold und Annemarie Meyer (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), 457.

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